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STATE V. ROMERO: THE LEGACY OF PUEBLO LAND
GRANTS AND THE CONTOURS OF JURISDICTION IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
ROBERT L. LUCERO, JR.I. INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Pueblos have always been unique among the native peoples of
the Americas, particularly in the way that they relate to other sovereigns.' Currently,
three sovereigns, the United States, New Mexico, and the Pueblo governments, hold
jurisdiction to varying extents and over various matters in Pueblo Indian country
within the boundaries of the State of New Mexico.2 During the summers of 2001 and
2002, two separate incidents led to criminal charges against Pueblo Indians in
northern New Mexico. 3 The resulting criminal cases worked their way through state,
federal, and tribal courts as each court considered which had jurisdiction over these
matters. 4 In the wake of the delayed prosecution caused by these jurisdictional
deliberations, the alleged victims and others became dissatisfied with what appeared
to be prosecution-free zones akin to the no-man's land of New Mexico's Old-West
days. 5 Eventually, the U.S. Congress stepped in to ensure that crimes committed
anywhere in New Mexico would not go without prosecution. 6 Nevertheless, the
legislation passed in 2005 was not retroactive and therefore did not apply to the
prosecution of these particular defendants. 7 As a result, the New Mexico state
judiciary had to decide if it had jurisdiction to try these two cases.
This Note examines the opinion of the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v.
Romero, in which the court held that the state has no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes
committed by Indians within the external boundaries of Pueblo land grants. 8 Part II
begins by providing a historical background of both the Pueblo land grants and the

* University of New Mexico School of Law, J.D. candidate 2008. The author extends his sincere gratitude
to Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber for her skilled advisement and to Professors Michael Browde, G. Emlen Hall,
and Laura E. G6mez for their continuous encouragement. Deana Bennett, Nikko Harada, Kate Girard, and Tyler
Atkins provided invaluable editorial guidance. As always, thank you to Tamarah L. Lucero for your constant
support.
1. For a discussion of the unique historical, political, and cultural background of the Pueblos from the
perspective of Pueblo authors, see generally EDWARD P. DOZIER, THE PUEBLO INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 31-37
(George & Louise Spindler eds., 1970); ALFONSO ORTIZ, THE PUEBLO (Frank W. Porter El ed., 1994); JOE S.
SANDO, PUEBLO NATIONS: EIGHT CENTURIES OF PUEBLO INDIAN HISTORY (Ann Mason ed., 1992).
2. See infra notes 131-172 and accompanying text.
3. State v. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 1 2-3, 142 P.3d 887, 888-89, cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1494 (2007).
4. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 142 P.3d 887; State v. Romero, 2004-NMCA-012, 84 P.3d 670; State v.
Gutierrez, No. 24,731 (N.M. Ct. App. May 20, 2004); see also Nicholas Riccardi, A Matter ofJurisdiction,Justice,
L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at A5.
5. See Riccardi, supra note 4.
6. Congress, led by New Mexico's delegation of representatives and senators, amended the Pueblo Lands
Act by adding a provision that mandated the structure of criminal jurisdiction within the Pueblo land grants.
Pursuant to this amendment, federal courts have jurisdiction over major crimes committed by or against Indians;
the State of New Mexico has jurisdiction over any offense committed by a non-Indian, provided that the case does
under the jurisdiction of the United States; and the Pueblos have jurisdiction, "as an act of [their] inherent
not fall
power as an Indian tribe, over any offense committed by a member of the Pueblo or an Indian," provided that Pueblo
jurisdiction has not been preempted by the United States. S.279, 109th Cong., 119 Stat. 2573, 2573-74 (2005).
7. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039,1 1 n.1, 142 P.3d at 888 n.l.
8. Id. 1 26, 142 P.3d at 896.
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legal issue of adjudicative jurisdiction in Indian country. 9 Part In continues by
tracing the facts and procedural history of Romero.l° Part IV examines the rationale
of the New Mexico Supreme Court and discusses how it came to its conclusions."
Part V analyzes the court's rationale, focusing first on its application of the U.S.
Supreme Court's analysis in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie 12 and second on its
analogy between Pueblos and reservations. 3 Finally, Part VI discusses the
implications of Romero with respect to civil jurisdiction in Pueblo Indian country,
as well as how the Romero court has positioned its opinion with regard to state and
federal recognition of inherent Pueblo sovereignty.' 4 Although the Romero court
correctly decided the legal issue of whether the State of New Mexico may prosecute
Pueblo members for alleged crimes committed within the exterior boundaries of
Pueblo land grants, it leaves open possibilities that create more questions than
answers for New Mexico practitioners in Pueblo Indian country.
11. BACKGROUND
To better appreciate the analysis and implications discussed below, it is necessary
to understand the historical and legal background behind this controversy.' 5 First,
this Note summarizes the history of Pueblo sovereignty and the Pueblo land grants. 6
Subsequently, it examines the origin and evolution of the term of art "Indian
country" as applicable to Romero. 17 Finally, the reader is provided with an assessment of the jurisdictional status of Indian country, including an evaluation of
inherent tribal sovereignty as a source of tribal jurisdiction. 8 Because each of these
topics is rich enough to provide material for a lifetime of scholarship, this Note
presents only a thumbnail sketch to familiarize the reader with the historical and
legal background relevant to this case.
A. Pueblo History and the Pueblo Land Grants
The history of the Pueblo people is a long one, as they are "an ancient people
whose history goes back into the farthest reaches of time."' 9 Archeological evidence
shows that the ancestors of the Pueblo people occupied land that is now located
within the borders of New Mexico and the other four-corners states as early as
10,000 B.C. 20 Indeed, the Romero court noted that "Taos Pueblo was settled in
approximately 1000 A.D., ' 2 ' and that "[o]ur government has previously recognized

9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II1.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
13. See infra PartV.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. The New Mexico Supreme Court in Romero also found it necessary to present a paragraph on this
historical and legal background. State v. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 4, 142 P.3d 887, 889, cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 1494 (2007).
16. See infra Part l1A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. SANDO, supra note 1, at 21.
20. See DOZIER, supra note 1.
21. State v. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 4, 142 P.3d 887, 889, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1494 (2007) (citing
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22
that Pojoaque Pueblo has been inhabited since approximately 850-1100 A.D."
Since the beginning of their existence, the Pueblos exercised inherent sovereignty
over their land and people, which they have maintained to some extent throughout
their history, despite the arrival of other sovereigns: Spain, Mexico, and the United
States.23

1. New Spain Comes to the Pueblos
The Rio Grande Pueblo people first encountered Europeans when the exploratory
expedition of Francisco Vasquez de Coronado, commissioned in 1540, entered
Pueblo country.24 Coronado set up a center of operations at Tiguex Pueblo near
present-day Bernalillo, from which he explored the surrounding area and
encountered other Pueblos. 25 At that time, the estimated number of Pueblo settlements was between sixty and ninety-two.26 Not until 1598 did Spanish settlement
of New Mexico begin with the entrance of colonists under the organization and
leadership of Don Juan de Ofiate.27 Decades of mistreatment and abuse at the hands
of Spanish colonists and missionaries resulted in the Pueblo Revolt of 1680.28
The Spanish governor at the time of the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 was Antonio de
Otermin.2 ' The year after the Pueblos expelled the Spanish from New Mexico,
Otermin traveled through Pueblo lands on an unsuccessful mission to investigate the
causes of the revolt and the identities of the organizers. 30 The next Spanish
Governor, Pedro Reneros de Posada, engaged in a comparable mission seven years
later and, like Otermin, was unsuccessful. 31 The next year, yet another governor
engaged in an expedition through Pueblo lands and, upon returning to El Paso, made
grants of land to the Pueblos.32 A Zia Pueblo man, Bartolom6 de Ojeda, served as
a witness to "[tihis strange spectacle, of 'conquerors' who had been evicted making

RUBIN SALAZ MARQUEZ, NEW MEXICO: A BRIEF MULTI-HISTORY 4 (1999)).
22. Id. (citing Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Notice of Inventory Completion for Native
American Human Remains and Associated Funerary Objects from New Mexico in the Possession of the Museum
of Indian Arts and Culture/Laboratory of Anthropology, Museum of New Mexico, Santa Fe, N.M., 63 Fed. Reg.
35,608 (June 30, 1998)). Interestingly, the Romero court, an institution of New Mexico state government, refers to
a document produced by the federal government as support for its assertion of what "[o]ur government has
previously recognized." id.
23. See infra notes 24-95 and accompanying text.
24. See DOZIER, supra note 1, at 43.
25. See id.
26. FELIX S. COHEN ET AL., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.07[2][a], at 320 & n.924
(Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., rev. ed. 2005).
27. See DOZIER, supra note 1, at 46-47.
28. SANDO, supra note I, at 61-65. In the period between the beginning of Spanish settlement and the
Pueblo Revolt of 1680, "the Pueblo peoples lost 62 percent of their settlements and about 78 percent of their
population." ELINORE M. BARRETT, CONQUEST AND CATASTROPHE: CHANGING RIO GRANDE PUEBLO SETrLEMENT
PATTERNS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 2 (2002). For a detailed examination of the Pueblo
Revolt, including its causes and aftermath, see ANDREW L. KNAUT, THE PUEBLO REVOLT OF 1680: CONQUEST AND
RESISTANCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW MExICO (1995).

29.
30.
31.
32.

SANDO, supra note 1, at 65.
Id. at 66-67; see also KNAUT, supra note 28, at 172-74.
SANDO, supranote l, at 67.
Id. Sando notes that each of these governors were acting "in absentia" during their various expeditions.
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gifts of parcels of land belonging to their victims. '33 Nevertheless, it is to these
grants that "all claimants to private lands in [New Mexico]... trace their titles to the
original owner, the [Spanish] Crown."' Indeed, "[t]he rights of conquest, the law
of nations, and even the Pope...agreed that the land of New Mexico belonged to
[Spanish monarchs] Ferdinand and Isabella by virtue of their underwriting
Columbus's voyages of discovery."35
An often-overlooked aspect of New Mexico's legal history during this period is
the effort "on the part of the officials of the Spanish government, not only to control
the relationship of Spaniard and Indian, but to provide legal protection for the
latter., 36 The Spanish governors of New Mexico appointed an official entitled El
Protectorde Indios, who was charged with representing the Pueblos in any litigation
before Spanish tribunals or officials.37 In addition, the Spanish colonial legal system
provided protection for the property rights of the Pueblos, as evidenced by a royal
cidula38 published in 1687 that describes an ordinance issued in 1567 ordering:
"[E]ach of the Indian Pueblos as might need land upon which to live and sow,
should have given to them five hundred varas, and more should it be necessary;
and that from that time forward there should not be granted to anyone lands or
grounds unless they should be located a thousand varas, cloth or silk measure,
away from and separate from the pueblos and houses of the Indians....'39
This royal cidula eventually became the basis of the New Mexico governors'
authority to make land grants to the Pueblos. n Although the cidula later speaks of
granting land measured up to six hundred varas to the north, south, east, and west
of the Pueblo center, "constant revision of both the law and general practice
increased the size of the pueblo lands to a league, 5,000 varas, in each direction."'"
33. Id.
34. G. Emlen Hall, The Pueblo Grant Labyrinth, in LAND, WATER, AND CULTURE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
HISPANIC LAND GRANTS 67, 72 (Charles L. Briggs & John R. Van Ness eds., 1987). Professor Hall points out the
historical irony that "the Pueblos never produced one of these so-called Cruzate grants until very late in the
eighteenth century" and furthermore that "late in the nineteenth century, a United States handwriting expert for the
Court of Private Land Claims would show these 1689 grants to be clumsy and relatively modem forgeries." Id. at
77.
35. Id. at 72. The U.S. Supreme Court incorporated the doctrine of property acquisition by conquest and
discovery into the law of the United States in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). See also infra
note 175 and accompanying text.
36. HERBERT 0. BRAYER, PUEBLO INDIAN LAND GRANTS OF THE "Rio ABAJO," NEW MEXICO 8 (Amo Press
1979) (1938).
37. CHARLES R. CUTTER, THE PROTECTOR DE INDIOS IN COLONIAL NEW MEXICO, 1659-1821, at 2-3,

106-07 (1986). Despite having an appointed legal representative, Pueblo Indians were also successful in litigation
before the Spanish judiciary without the advocate's assistance, often going directly to the governor or even to
higher-ranking officials. Id. at 69-72; CHARLES R. CUTTER, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF NORTHERN NEW SPAIN,
1700-1810, at 145 (1995) [hereinafter CUTTER, LEGAL CULTURE]; see also WOODROW BORAH, JUSTICE BY
INSURANCE: THE GENERAL INDIAN COURT OF COLONIAL MEXICO AND THE LEGAL AIDES OF THE HALF-REAL 377
(1983).

38. A cddula is "a decree of the Spanish Crown; esp., a royal enactment issued by the Council of Castile or
of the Indies." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 237 (8th ed. 2004).
39. BRAYER, supra note 36, at 11-12 (quoting a royal cddula from June 1687). For a discussion of Spanish
standards of measurement, see infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
40. SANDO, supra note 1, at 108.
41. BRAYER, supra note 36, at 13. To put Spanish land measurements in modem perspective, a vara is a
measure of distance roughly equivalent to 33.3 inches, whereas a Spanish league consists of 5,000 varas,
approximately 2.63 miles. See id.; G. EMLEN HALL, FOUR LEAGUES OF PECOS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE PECOS
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As a result, the accepted size of the Pueblo land grants became standardized during
the Spanish period to a measurement of four square leagues, which is equivalent to
17,712 acres.42
An important component of the legal protections extended by the Spanish
government to the Pueblos consisted of measures to protect their property from
fraudulent dispositions and encroachment.43 Because the Spanish crown viewed
Indians as both wards and vassals, "[a]s vassals they could own real property; but
the crown tried to protect them, as its official wards, from disposing of it." 44 The
Spanish dictated narrow means through which Pueblos and Pueblo members could
sell their lands to colonists, requiring a public auction that could only take place
after notice was given and thirty days had passed. 5 Another legal mechanism
prohibited non-Indians from encroaching on Pueblo lands by requiring a corridor of
isolation around the Pueblo land grants within which non-Indians could not graze
livestock or engage in agriculture.46 The problem with this geographic system was
that some of the Pueblos, such as Pojoaque and Namb6, were located so closely
together that the four leagues of one Pueblo overlapped with those of a neighboring
Pueblo.47 On the other hand, more isolated Pueblos, such as Taos, "had sufficient
vacant space between Pueblos to fully enforce government-imposed restrictions on
the proximity of new grants from the Crown's public domain. 48 Despite these
protective measures, Pueblo lands were sold and encroached upon, resulting in
litigation that was resolved inconsistently by Spanish authorities. 49 As unpredictable
as Spanish resolutions of land disputes had become, the Pueblos were only
beginning their battles to protect their lands.
2. The Mexican Republic and the Pueblos
Although Mexican governance of New Mexico lasted only twenty-five years,
from 1821 to 1846, its impact on the Pueblo people was profound.5 ' The newly
independent Mexican government implemented the Plande Ayala, which did away
with distinctions based on race and created one class of citizenship for all Mexican
subjects.5 ' The Plan had many important effects on the Pueblo people:
Church books, census records, and tax rolls no longer designated entries by
Indian and non-Indian status. All now belonged to what one New Mexico
official called la gran familia mejicana, in which no distinctions were
supposedly allowed... .Pueblos operated their own municipal governments, paid
GRANT, 1800-1933, at 84-85 (John R. Van Ness ed., 1984).
42. See BRAYER, supra note 36, at 13; see also CUTTER, LEGAL CULTURE, supra note 37, at 38-39.
43. See HALL, supra note 41, at 12.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 12-13.
47. See Hall, supra note 34, at 76.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 78-84.
50. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. Although at first some Pueblos swore their allegiance to
the Mexican republic, a group of Pueblo Indians and Hispanos united in an unsuccessful rebellion in 1837. DAVID
J.WEBER, THE MExICAN FRONTIER, 1821-1846: THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST UNDER MEXICO 5,261-65 (Ray Allen
Billington & Howard R. Lamar eds., 1982).
51. BRAYER, supra note 36, at 17.
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taxes, and served in the militia along with non-Indians. The Pueblos were full
citizens for the first time.5"
Unfortunately, this citizenship came with a price: the loss of land through sales
to non-Indians. Unlike under Spanish rule, with its protections of Indian land against
non-Indian acquisition and encroachment, Mexican rule offered no special
protections to the Pueblo people.53 As a result, "the number of real property transfers
from Pueblo Indians to non-Indians increased markedly during the period of
Mexican rule., 5 4 Notably, by the end of the Mexican period there were more nonIndians than Indians living within the Pueblo land grants of Pojoaque, Tesuque,
Namb6, and San Ildefonso. 55 Although the Pueblos maintained their one-league
corridors of isolation surrounding their land grants, "no Pueblo challenged the
presence of the large number of non-Indians living within its borders... .who claimed
a right to be inside the Pueblo boundaries by virtue of a common source-the
Pueblo grants now conveyed in part to them. 5 6 Due to the increasing encroachment
on Pueblo lands and the significant changes in the legal status of Pueblo people, the
legacy of the Mexican period would have unexpected implications on Pueblo land
grants under a new sovereign: the United States.57
3. United States Occupation and the Territorial Period
When the United States took possession of the Territory of New Mexico in 1846,
it inherited a muddled set of claims and complaints concerning the ownership of
property within the Pueblo land grants. 58 Much of this confusion was fueled by
various interpretations of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,59 which ended the war
between the United States and Mexico in 1848.60 This treaty provided that Mexican
citizens living within the borders of the newly ceded lands could either choose to
retain their Mexican citizenship or be considered to have elected to become U.S.
citizens by default.6 1 In any event, the United States would honor the existing
property rights of New Mexicans.62 Because Mexican law had considered the Pueblo
people as full citizens entitled to no more or less than any other citizen, unlike the
Spanish legal notion of the Pueblo people as wards/vassals, the United States was
faced with a question concerning whether it would consider the Pueblo people as
citizens rather than wards.63

52. Hall, supra note 34, at 86. Mexican Governor of New Mexico Facundo Melgares instructed that Pueblo
Indians were to be considered equal citizens with Hispanos, particularly concerning their right to vote and hold
public office. See WEBER, supra note 50, at -1-7.
53. Hall, supra note 34, at 86.
54. Id. at 87.
55. Id. at 91.
56. Id. at 91-92.
57. See infra notes 58-95 and accompanying text.
58. See Hall, supra note 34, at 91-92; BRAYER, supra note 36, at 20-21.
59. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
60. Id.; BRAYER, supra note 36, at 20-21.
61. MYRA ELLEN JENKINS & ALBERT H. SCHROEDER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEw MExIco 49-50 (9th ed.
1993).
62. Id.
63. HALL, supra note 41, at 69.
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Recognizing Indian people as full citizens was at odds with federal Indian law
and U.S. policy toward Indians at the time. Such policy viewed native people as
wards to be relocated and supervised as the federal government saw fit.64 As early
as 1831, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the federal government had an
obligation to safeguard the welfare of tribes. 65 This relationship between the tribes66
and the federal government was characterized as "that of a ward to his guardian."
In contrast to its previous paternalistic relations with other tribes, the Pueblos
challenged the United States with "an Indian problem for which it had no
precedents" because the Pueblo people were "a sedentary people with permanent
villages, and with large areas of land" that they held in fee simple. 67 A glaring
question emerged from this problem: what form would the protection provided by
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo take? If the treaty was self-executing, 68 then the
United States would face many difficulties in discerning privately held land from
public lands, 69 particularly in light of the contested nature of land claims described
above.7 ° To avoid these complications, the United States deemed that it held all of
the formerly Mexican lands as a sovereign power.7 The new sovereign then
established a process for claimants to assert their property rights.72 Pueblo people
were quick to point out that their property rights had been vested in fee simple since
the time of the grants from the Spanish crown. 73 In 1858, the U.S. Congress
confirmed and patented the Pueblo land grants.7' Nevertheless, non-Indian encroachment on Pueblo lands continued, and although New Mexico Territorial Governor
James S. Calhoun communicated the Pueblos' land grant problems to Washington
D.C., the federal government did little to address his concerns.75
The territorial and federal courts affirmatively addressed, however, the question
of the legal status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands. In an 1869 case, United
States v. Lucero,76 the New Mexico Territorial Supreme Court addressed the legal

64. BRAYER, supra note 36, at 20.
65. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1831); see also infra note 180 and accompanying
text.
66. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
67. BRAYER, supra note 36, at 20. For a discussion of the impact of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on the
Pueblos, see Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo,26 N.M. L. REv. 201, 215-17 (1996).
68. "[Tlreaties are self-executing under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (art. VI, § 2) if
textually capable of judicial enforcement and intended to be enforced in that manner." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 38, at 1391.

69. See HALL, supra note 41, at 70.
70. See supra notes 32-69.
71.

See HALL, supra note 41, at 70.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 71. In fact, "General Kearney had been in Santa Fe for less than two days when a delegation of
Pueblo Indians met with him and demanded that the [United States] government do something to restore the lands
stolen from them by Spanish and Mexican settlers." Id.
74. Act of Dec. 22, 1858, ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374.
75. HALL, supra note 41, at 73.
76. 1 N.M. 422 (1869). For engaging accounts of the preceding events and the aftermath of the Lucero
decision, see HALL, supra note 41, at 116-20, and Laura E. G6mez, Off-White in an Age of White Supremacy:
Mexican Elites and the Rights of Indians and Blacks in Nineteenth-CenturyNew Mexico, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L.

REv. 9, 33-38 (2005).
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question of whether the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, 77 which prohibited U.S.
citizens from encroaching on tribal lands, applied to the Pueblos.7 8 In a racially
charged opinion that revealed the institutional prejudice of the United States against
Native Americans at the time, the court held that the Act did not apply to the
Pueblos because the Pueblo people were not "a wild, savage, and barbarous race,"
but instead, they were citizens of the United States due to the operation of the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo. 79 This holding implied that the Pueblo people were not
entitled to the trusteeship that the United States provided other tribes. Ten years
later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of United States v. Joseph,80 echoing
the Lucero court's holding that the 1834 Act did not apply to the Pueblos. 8'
Although the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the Pueblos "hold their lands
by a right superior to that of the United States ....[dating] back to grants made by the
government of Spain, '82 this acknowledgement did little to prevent the loss of
Pueblo lands due to encroachment by non-Indians. 83 As a result of the Lucero and
Joseph decisions, the Pueblos were left without governmental protection of their
lands and with little respect for their inherent tribal sovereignty. 84 This situation
would continue into the early twentieth century.
4. New Mexico Statehood
It was not until the New Mexico Territory achieved statehood in the early
twentieth century that the alienation of Pueblo lands received serious reconsideration
from the Federal government. The U.S. Congress passed the Enabling Act for New
Mexico, 85 which stated that "all lands.. .owned or held by any Indian or Indian
tribes.. .acquired through or from the United States or any prior sovereignty.. .shall
be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the Congress. 86 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the

77. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729; see also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
78. Lucero, 1 N.M. at 427.
79. Id. at 425. Notwithstanding this statement, the citizenship of Pueblo people was illusory, and they did
not acquire "the primary right of citizenship," i.e., the right to vote, until 1948. See SANDO, supra note 1, at 90-91.
80. 94 U.S. 614 (1876).
81. Id. at 617. The U.S. Supreme Court refrained from going as far as the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Lucero and did not declare the Pueblo people to be United States citizens; instead the Court limited itself to "decide
nothing beyond what is necessary to the judgment we are to render, [and left] that question until it shall be made
in some case where the rights of citizenship are necessarily involved." Id. at 618.
82. Id.
83. See HALL, supra note 41, at 138. For an engaging account of the preceding events and the aftermath of
the Joseph decision, see id. at 128-38.
84. See SANDO, supra note 1, at 88-90.
85. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557.
86. Id. § 2. This provision was later adopted into the New Mexico Constitution as follows:
The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title
to the unappropriated and ungranted public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all
lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title

to which shall have been acquired through the United States, or any prior sovereignty; and that
until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and
remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress
of the United States....
N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
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case of United States v. Sandoval,87 in which it held that the Pueblos fell under
federal superintendence,88 departing from the Court's previous decision in Joseph.89
The implication of this case was that the Pueblos, like other tribes, could not alienate
their land without federal approval. 90The unanswered question, however, concerned
what should happen to the disputed lands held by non-Indians within the Pueblo
land grant boundaries. 9'
The U.S. Congress answered that question by passing the Pueblo Lands Act in
1924.92 The Act created the Pueblo Lands Board, composed of executive appointees,
which examined all property claims within the Pueblo land grants. 93 The attorney
general then brought actions to quiet title in federal district court to resolve claims
in which the Pueblo Lands Board found no extinguishment of Pueblo title.94
Through this process the Pueblo land grants were finally adjudicated in terms of
title, 95 but the jurisdictional complications that resulted were only beginning.
B. A Brief Legal History of Indian Country
Before examining the modern legal configuration of jurisdiction in Indian
country, which is based largely on federal statutes and subsequent judicial
interpretations, 96 a brief examination of the history of the term of art "Indian
country" serves to illuminate this Note's subsequent analysis of State v. Romero and
its implications. Terms such as "Indian country" have never had "a single, allpurpose federal definition that [has] operated consistently across time... .Nevertheless, these terms have served to delineate jurisdictional authority, legal responsibilities, and property rights through much of federal Indian law." 97
1. Origins and Development of "Indian Country" Before 1948
The term "Indian country" in America dates back to 1763, when King George of
England issued a royal proclamation to create a border between Indian land and land

87. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
88. Id. at 48-49.
89. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876). Sandoval did not involve a dispute over title to land within
the Pueblo grants, but instead dealt with the status of the Pueblos for determination of the legal question of whether
Congress could regulate the importation of intoxicating liquors onto Pueblo lands. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 36-38.
The Joseph decision was more explicitly overturned by United States v. Candelaria,a case involving a quiet title
action on Pueblo land, in which the Court decided that "[t]he Indians of the [P]ueblo are wards of the United States,
and hold their lands subject to the restriction that the same cannot be alienated in any wise without its consent." 271
U.S. 432, 443 (1926).
90. BRAYER, supra note 36, at 25.
91. See id.; SANDO, supranote 1,at 114.
92. Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636 (repealed 2000).
93. See id. § 2; BRAYER, supra note 36, at 28.
94. BRAYER, supra note 36, at 28.

95. Id. The fallout of the Pueblo Lands Act did not favor the Pueblos, as is evidenced by lost Pueblo property
rights and charges of neglect of duty and misconduct against Pueblo Lands Board commissioners. See SANDO, supra
note 1, at 114.
96. See generally Nancy Thorington, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian
Country: A Roadmapfor Improving InteractionAmong Tribal,State and Federal Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 973 (2000) (describing the contours of civil and criminal jurisdiction in Indian country); Kevin K. Washburn,
American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MicH. L. REV. 709, 715-17 (2006) (providing a "Legal Description
of the Indian Country Regime" with regard to criminal jurisdiction).
97. COHEN ET AL., supra note 26, § 3.01, at 134 (citation omitted).
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belonging to the British colonists. 98 This frontier, set out for the maintenance of
peace and the protection of the colonists, stemmed from the recognition of "the
reality that areas beyond this border, though claimed by Britain, were effectively
beyond its control," and were instead under the control of Indian sovereigns. 99
Within decades of the American Revolution, the U.S. Congress passed the first
statutory definition of Indian country, contained in the Indian Intercourse Act of
1796,'00 which was similar to the 1793 Proclamation and stated that all lands beyond
the western frontier were Indian country.'I 1 Subsequently, Congress passed the
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834,102 which moved the frontier of Indian Country
further west and regulated the conduct of individuals in Indian country. 1°3
Federal Indian policy changed in the mid-nineteenth century-Indians were
removed, often forcibly, onto reservations and granted individual allotments of land
in an effort to achieve assimilation." These policies rendered the definition of
Indian country unworkable, and in 1874 the Indian country definition was deleted
from the revised statutes, leaving courts to arbitrate the meaning of the term. 0 5 The
most important case during this period, Bates v. Clark,"'6 dealt with the issue of the
Indian country status of lands ceded by Indians under the 1834 Act. In Bates, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that
all the country described by the act of 1834 as Indian country remains Indian
country so long as the Indians retain their original title to the soil, and ceases to
be Indian country whenever they lose that title, in the absence of any different
provision by treaty or by act of Congress. °7
As applied to the Pueblos, this holding was clarified by the Court in UnitedStates
v. Sandoval,108 which affirmed that Indian country can exist within the boundaries
of a state and found that the Pueblo lands in New Mexico are Indian country based
upon the Pueblos' status as "dependent Indian communities."' 9 A subsequent case,
United States v. McGowan," ° further interpreted the term "dependent Indian
community" as applied to lands that, unlike the lands in Sandoval, were not held in
fee simple by the tribe."' Instead, at issue in McGowan were lands in the state of
Nevada that were bought by the federal government to be held in trust for a tribe for

98. Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History ofIndian Country, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 283, 289 (1997). Matal
interprets Indian country history in a way that is at odds with several prominent Indian law scholars; however, this
is not true concerning his analysis of the intent and content of the 1763 Proclamation. Id.
99. Id. at 290.
100. Indian Intercourse Act, Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; see also COHENETAL., supra note 26,
§ 3.04[21[b], at 184.
101. Indian Intercourse Act, Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469.
102. Trade and Intercourse Act, Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1, 4 Stat. 729.
103. See COHEN Er AL., supra note 26, § 3.04[2][b], at 185.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. 95 U.S. 204 (1877).
107. Id. at 209.
108. 231 U.S. 28 (1913); see COHEN ET AL., supra note 26, § 3.04[2][b], at 187-88 (describing the
development of Sandoval and other cases as the origins of the modern Indian country statute).
109. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 45-46.
110. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
111. Id.
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the purposes of the tribe establishing a "colony."1' 12 The Court held that the colony
in question was Indian country, as it was set aside for the use of Indians."13 The slow
incremental adjudication and definition of Indian country by the courts would not
go unnoticed by the U.S. Congress, which soon legislated yet another definition of
Indian country."'
2. Indian Country Statute
In 1948, Congress enacted the Indian Country Statute' 1 5 to "consolidate[]
numerous conflicting and inconsistent provisions of law into a concise statement of
the applicable law." ' 1 6 The statute set out three categories of Indian country: (a) land
located within reservations,1 7(b) dependent Indian communities, and (c) Indian
allotments with Indian title.
With regard to reservation lands, prior to the passage of the Indian Country
Statute, any non-Indian fee lands within reservations were not considered Indian
country because Indian country status was tied to Indian title. 118 The first subsection
of the Indian Country Statute changed the status of non-Indian-held lands within
reservations. It provided that Indian country included "all land within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation."" 9 The Court in Seymour v. Superintendent2 ° affirmed the
constitutionality of that subsection and pronounced the federal policy against
creating checkerboard jurisdiction.
Congress codified the holdings of Sandoval and McGowan121 into section
1151(b), which states that Indian country shall include "all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of
a state."' 1 2 In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 123 the Court interpreted section
1151(b) as establishing a two-prong test for whether the land in question is a
dependent Indian community, and thus Indian country. 24 This test requires that (1)
the land be set aside for the use of Indians and (2) the federal government have
are rooted in
superintendence of the land. 125 The Court noted that these two prongs
26
the text "dependent Indian community" found in section 1151 (b). 1

112. Id. at 538-39.

113. Id. at 539.
114. See infra Part II.B.2.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(1948).

116. Id. § 1151 (2000) (Historical and Revision Notes).
117. Id.
118. See supra Partl.B.1.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1151.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962).
See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 1151(b).
522 U.S. 520 (1998).
Id. at 530.

125. Id.

126. Id. at 530-31.
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C. JurisdictionalMilieu of Pueblo Indian Country
The previous discussion of the origins and evolution of Indian country127 refers
little to the current jurisdictional status of Indian country, yet such an understanding
is essential to fully appreciate the New Mexico Supreme Court's holding in State v.
Romero. To provide context for such an understanding, this Note continues by
summarizing the legal regimes governing criminal'2 8 and civil 129 jurisdiction in
Indian country, followed by a brief analysis of the legal discourse surrounding
inherent tribal sovereignty as a source of tribal jurisdiction. 3 '
1. Criminal Jurisdiction in Pueblo Indian Country
The legal regime governing criminal jurisdiction in Indian country consists
primarily of congressional legislation and federal case law that parcels out the
criminal jurisdiction of Indian country among three types of sovereigns: the federal
government, state government, and tribal government.' 3 '
Three primary statutes set out the extent of federal jurisdiction over crimes
involving Indians and Indian country. First, the Indian Country Statute' 3 2 requires
an examination of the land status of the location of the alleged crime. Second, the
General Crimes Act, 133 also referred to as the Indian Country Crimes Act, states that
"the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed
in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.. .shall
extend to the Indian country."' 134 The General Crimes Act does not, however, allow
federal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over "offenses committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian... who has
been punished by the local law of the tribe."' 135 The General Crimes Act grants
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed in Indian country by
non-Indians against Indians. 36 Third, the Major Crimes Act 37 applies only to Indian
defendants charged with committing certain enumerated felonies in Indian country,
placing such defendants under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.' 38
States generally "lack jurisdiction in Indian country absent a special grant of
jurisdiction."'' 39 Although Congress has granted some states criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country for certain matters pursuant to Public Law 280, New Mexico is
not one of the states that received such a jurisdictional grant. 14° Nevertheless, all

127. See supraPart ll.B.
128. See infra Part II.C.1.
129. See infra Part II.C.2.
130. See infra Part 1l.C.3.
131. See COHEN ET AL., supranote 26, ch. 9, at 731-71.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000); see also supra Part lI.B.2.
133. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
134. Id. Importantly, the Assimilative Crimes Act provides that, in the absence of any substantive federal
criminal statute governing the offense in question, the substantive criminal law of the state in which the offense
allegedly occurred shall be applied by the federal courts. Id. § 13.
135. Id. § 1152.
136. Id.
137. Id. § 1153.
138. Id.
139. COHENETAL., supranote 26, § 9.03[l], at 754.
140. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a)
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states reserve jurisdiction
over Indian country crimes committed by non-Indians
4
against non-Indians.1 '
Tribal courts retain jurisdiction over Indian country crimes not precluded by
exclusive federal jurisdiction. 142 For instance, tribal courts have jurisdiction over
Indians charged with Indian country crimes not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act
but are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over crimes enumerated in the Act. 143
In addition, tribal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over nonenumerated crimes committed by Indians in Indian country, regardless of whether
the offenses are against Indians or Non-Indians.' 44 Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court
established in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe145 that tribes have no criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians accused of crimes in Indian country.
2. Civil Jurisdiction in Pueblo Indian Country
Unlike tribal criminal jurisdiction, which has been significantly curtailed by
Congress and courts, tribal civil jurisdiction in Indian country is "more broad and
is subject to fewer of the federal limitations imposed on tribal courts' criminal
jurisdiction."' 46 As such, this Note will present a summary of civil jurisdiction in
Indian country 147 by beginning with the tribal courts and then addressing state and
federal courts in turn.
Tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil matters concerning an Indian
plaintiff and an Indian defendant, and Congress has not limited this jurisdiction,
which is "first and foremost a matter of internal tribal law."'148 Tribal court
jurisdiction over non-Indians in civil matters, however, is not so clear-cut. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the tribes' adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians can
extend no further than their ability to regulate non-Indians. 14 Civil litigation
involving non-Indians that arises on non-Indian fee land in Indian country presents
more complications.' 50 In Montana v. United States,'5' the Supreme Court held that

(2000)). Initially, Public Law 280 granted jurisdiction to the states of Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon, and Wisconsin. Id. Subsequently, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah,
and Washington have acquired criminal jurisdiction in Indian country by state constitutional amendment or statute
pursuant to Public Law 280. COHEN Er AL., supra note 26, § 6.04[3][a], at 544 & nn.305-08.
141. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882); see also COHEN ETAL., supra note 26, § 9.03[ l],
at 754-55.
142. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 26, § 9.04, at 756-57.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
144. See id. § 1152 (2000); id. § 1153.
145. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). The Oliphant decision has been intensely criticized by proponents of tribal
sovereignty. See COHEN Er AL., supranote 26, § 4.02[3][b], at 226-28 & nn.192-96.

146. Thorington, supra note 96, at 1001-02.
147. The definition of Indian country found in the Indian Country Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151, has been used
to determine Indian country status of lands for purposes of civil jurisdiction. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac
& Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125-26, 128 (1993); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
498 U.S. 505, 513 (1991); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987). But see
Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 n.9 (1997) (looking also to 18 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (2000) and § 1156
(2000), dealing with "dispensation and possession of intoxicants" as a basis for delineating the boundaries of Indian
country).
148. COHENETAL., supra note 26, § 7.02[1][a], at 599.
149. Strate, 520 U.S. at 422; Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 (2001).
150. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 26, § 7.02[l][a], at 600-01.
151.

450U.S. 544(1981).
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tribes generally lack civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians with two
specific exceptions: (1) when non-Indians "enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members" or (2) when conduct by non-Indians "threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare
of the tribe."' 512 However, subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have narrowed
53
the scope of the Montana exceptions. In Strate v. A-I Contractors,'
the Court held
that the tribe lacked civil jurisdiction over a personal injury claim brought by a nonIndian against another non-Indian for damages stemming from a highway accident
on land within reservation boundaries. 54 Four years later, in Nevada v. Hicks, 55 the
Court held that a tribe lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a civil action brought by a
tribal member against a state game warden for alleged property damage. 156 In Hicks,
the Court extended the general rule of Montana, precluding tribal civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians, to include claims arising on Indian-owned land. 157 As a result,
these cases continued the federal
judiciary's recent trend of curtailing tribal
58
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Although state courts have jurisdiction over civil suits involving Indians that arise
outside of Indian country,'59 state jurisdiction in Indian country is more limited. In
Williams v. Lee,' 6° the Supreme Court held that states lack civil jurisdiction over
tribal members in suits arising in Indian country because "the exercise of state
jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of tribal courts over reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.''
This "infringement" test from Williams has become the standard for determining
62
whether a state exercise of adjudicatory civil jurisdiction is permissible. 1
The U.S. Constitution and federal laws grant federal courts limited civil
jurisdiction, both within and outside of Indian country. 163 The two primary areas of
federal jurisdiction involve federal questions' 64 and diversity actions.' 65 Federal
question jurisdiction includes claims that arise from and require the interpretation
of the Constitution, federal statutes, treaties, or federal common law. 1 66 As a result,
any suit arising in Indian country that involves the Constitution, federal statutes,
treaties, or federal common law could invoke federal jurisdiction. 167 Diversity
jurisdiction requires that the parties be citizens of different states or nations and that
the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.168 As of 1924, Indians became citizens

152. Id. at 565-66.
153. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
154. Id. at 442-45.
155. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
156. Id. at 364-65.
157. Id. at 359.
158. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 26,
159. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
160. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
161. Id. at 223.
162. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 26,
163. See id. § 7.04[1][a], at 610-11.
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
165. Id. § 1332.
166. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 26,
167. Id. § 7.04[1][a], at612-13.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

§ 4.02[3][c], at 232-37.
411 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1973).

§ 4.02[3], at 224-37.

§ 7.04[1][a], at 612.
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of the United States, 169 but federal courts have held that Indians are not state citizens
for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction. 7 ° In addition, federal courts often defer
to tribal jurisdiction in recognition of possible interference with tribal governments'
control over their own dealings.'7 1 Although federal courts can review tribal
determinations of jurisdiction, the federal courts should generally defer to the tribal
courts, out of respect for tribal sovereignty, until tribal remedies are exhausted.17
3. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty as a Source of Jurisdiction
Tribal jurisdiction is rooted in the inherent sovereignty that tribes possess and
Nevertheless, the extent of tribal
have possessed since time immemorial.'
jurisdiction in Indian country has been litigated and legislated extensively, creating
a wide body of law that is largely incoherent.'74 Early U.S. Supreme Court cases
limited the extent of tribes' inherent sovereignty, beginning with Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 7 5 in which the Court held that that the United States acquired absolute
title to its lands in America by virtue of discovery and conquest. 7 6 In contrast, "the
Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed,
while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of
transferring the absolute title to others.' 77 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,75 the
Court held that tribes are to be treated as "domestic dependent nations," distinct
from states and foreign sovereigns. 179 The Court analogized the domestic dependent
status of tribes as one of wardship under the protection and supervision of the
United States, setting the legal foundation for the trust relationship between the
United States and Indian tribes. 80
Although Johnson v. M'Intosh and CherokeeNation v. Georgiaseverely curtailed
the sovereign powers of tribes, other early U.S. Supreme Court cases affirmed the
tribes' inherent sovereignty. A year after Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,in Worcester
v. Georgia,'8' the Court acknowledged that the tribes are sovereign powers,
"retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial."' 82 Further, the Court limited the extent to which states may

169. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
170. See COHEN E7 AL., supra note 26, § 7.04[1][c], at 618-19 & nn.166-67.
171. Accord Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
172. See id. at 19; Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 855-56 (1985).
173. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 26, § 4.01[1][a], at 204-09.
174. See generally Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal
Sovereigny, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003) (analyzing the Court's disregard for long-standing principles of
federal Indian law and contradiction of congressional and executive policies); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Shrinking
Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest Tribal Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REv. 1281 (1995) (describing state
efforts to decrease the amount of land considered Indian country in order to move adjudicatory and regulatory
authority to states).
175. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
176. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
177. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
178. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
179. Id. at 17.
180. Id.; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text. For a description of the development of the trust
doctrine in federal Indian law, see COHEN Er AL., supra note 26, § 15.03, at 967-69.

181. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
182. Id. at 559.
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regulate tribes, noting that the federal government maintains "exclusive regulation
of intercourse with the Indians; and, so long as this power shall be exercised, it
cannot be obstructed by the state."' 183 Subsequently, in Talton v. Mayes,"8 the Court
held that because the tribes' inherent sovereignty predates the Constitution, tribal
courts are not bound by due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 185
Developing within the parameters established by these early U.S. Supreme Court
cases, the legal doctrine surrounding inherent tribal sovereignty continues to evolve
in modem times. In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Duro v. Reina'86 that nonmember Indians do not fall under the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts.' 87 This
holding had a severe impact on the ability of tribes to govern themselves due to the
large number of non-member Indians that live in lands subject to tribal jurisdiction.' 88 In response to this ruling, Congress passed the "Duro-fix" by amending the
definitions section of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) 8 9 to read, in part:

(2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices,
bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts
of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians[.]' 90
Congress enacted the Duro-fix by amending the ICRA, rather than by enacting a
new substantive law, at the end of a debate over the distinction between
congressional delegation of federal judicial power to the tribes on one hand, and
recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty on the other. 9 ' As evidenced by the
language of the Duro-fix, Congress confirmed that tribes may exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians in Indian country by virtue of their preexisting sovereign powers. 92
A few years later, in United States v. Lara,'93 the U.S. Supreme Court examined
the legitimacy of Congress's undertaking in the Duro-fix. A five-justice majority of
the Court upheld the validity of the Duro-fix as a constitutional exercise of congressional power to adjust the status of dependent sovereign tribes. '94 Furthermore,
the Lara majority upheld the congressional affirmation that the source of tribal

183. Id.at594.
184. 163 U.S. 376(1896).
185. Id.
at 384. Concern regarding a lack of due process and equal protection in tribal courts led to the passage
of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) in 1968.25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2000).
186. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
187. Id.at 682 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
188. Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 109,
109-10 & nn.7-8 (1992). For an analysis of Duro in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's "implicit divestiture" of
tribal sovereignty, departing from congressional and executive reaffirmations of inherent tribal sovereignty, see John
P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen's Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38
CONN. L.REv. 731, 740-41 (2006).
189. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03.
190. Id.§ 1301.
191. See Jessup Newton, supra note 188, at 110-17 (describing the legislative history of the Duro-fix).
192. See id.
193. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
194. Id. at 200.
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jurisdiction over non-member Indians was their inherent sovereignty. 195 Nonetheless, the narrow majority and differences of opinion
of the justices in Lara highlight
19 6
the fact that this remains a volatile area of law.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Having explored the legal history of the Pueblos, the term of art "Indian country,"
and the contours of adjudicatory jurisdiction within Indian country, this Note turns
to a discussion of the facts and procedural history that led to the New Mexico
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Romero. 97
A. Facts
On June 19, 2001, a Taos County grand jury indicted Del E. Romero, an enrolled
Taos Pueblo member, for aggravated battery against another enrolled Taos Pueblo
member.'9 8 Mr. Romero moved to dismiss the charge for lack of jurisdiction,
asserting that the alleged criminal acts occurred within the exterior boundaries of
Taos Pueblo. 99 The State of New Mexico argued that the incident occurred outside
the exterior boundaries of Taos Pueblo on privately owned fee land located within
the boundaries of the Town of Taos. 2°° The parties eventually stipulated that the
incident occurred at the Pueblo Alegre Mall, which is located on private property
within the Town of Taos and within the exterior boundaries of Taos Pueblo Land
Grant.2"' The district court dismissed the charges, concluding that the state did not
have jurisdiction to prosecute.2 2
More than a year later, on August 29, 2002, Matthew A. Gutierrez, an enrolled
member of Pojoaque Pueblo, was arraigned in Pojoaque Tribal Court for assault,
battery, carrying a concealed weapon, criminal negligence, and disorderly conduct.20 3 The alleged victims were non-Indians and the alleged crime occurred on
2°4
non-Indian fee land located within the exterior boundaries of Pojoaque Pueblo.
After tribal prosecution began, the State indicted Mr. Gutierrez for the same incident
on charges of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, child abuse, and battery
against a household member.205 On October 7, 2002, the Chief Judge of Pojoaque
Pueblo announced a "Memorandum Opinion and Declaratory Judgment" holding

195. Id. at 199.
196. See Gregory A. Smith, Pueblo Lands Act Amendment Signed into Law, 16 NATIVE AM. L. DIG. 2, 2-3
(2006). For an analysis of the constitutionality of the Duro-fix under equal protection and due process, see Will
Trachman, Comment, Tribal Criminal JurisdictionAfter U.S. v. Lara: Answering ConstitutionalChallenges to the

Duro Fix, 93 CAL. L. REV. 847 (2005); Eric Wolpin, Comment, Answering Lara's Call: May Congress Place
Nonmember Indians Within Tribal Jurisdiction Without Running Afoul of Equal Protection or Due Process

Requirements?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1071 (2006).
197. State v. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 142 P.3d 887, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1494 (2007).
198. Id. 2, 142 P.3d at 888.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. 1 2, 142 P.3d at 888-89.
203. Id. 1 3, 142 P.3d at 889.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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that the Pojoaque Tribal Court had jurisdiction.2° Mr. Gutierrez then moved to
dismiss the state indictment, arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction. 2 7 As
with Mr. Romero, the district court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction. °8
B. New Mexico Court of Appeals
In both cases, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the district court
decisions, holding that the state courts had jurisdiction over the matters in
controversy. 2° The court of appeals held that the State had jurisdiction to prosecute
Romero because the site of the incident was not classified as Indian country.2 10 The
court of appeals focused its analysis on whether the "extinguishment of the Pueblo
title to the lands underlying the town of Taos pursuant to the PLA [Pueblo Lands
Act] permanently change[d] the jurisdictional status of this land[.] '21 1 The court
concluded "that in enacting the PLA, Congress clearly understood that it was
altering the jurisdictional status of those lands as to which title was quieted in favor
of a non-Indian, and that unless Congress subsequently acted to restore the Indian
country status of these lands they remain outside Indian country., 2 12 Similarly, with
respect to the Gutierrez case, the court of appeals reversed the district court and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 1 3
C. New Mexico Supreme Court
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari for each case and
consolidated them "to determine whether the State has jurisdiction to prosecute
alleged crimes committed by Defendant Indians on private fee land within the
exterior boundaries of Defendants' respective pueblos. '214 The court noted that, "[i]f
the land in question is Indian country, the State prosecution must be dismissed. 2 15
Justice Serna, writing for the court, held that the lands in question "within the
exterior boundaries of both Taos and Pojoaque Pueblos are Indian country within
the meaning of § 1151(b) and Congress has not extinguished Indian country
status. 216 Therefore, the State lacked jurisdiction to prosecute either defendant for
incidents that happened on those lands.217 As a result, the New Mexico Supreme
Court reversed the decisions of the court of appeals.21 8

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. State v. Romero, 2004-NMCA-012, 84 P.3d 670; State v. Gutierrez, No. 24,731 (N.M. Ct. App. May
20, 2004).
210. Romero, 2004-NMCA-012, 8, 84 P.3d at 672.
211. Id. 8, 84 P.3d at 672.
212. Id. 17, 84 P.3d at 675. Significantly, whereas the New Mexico Court of Appeals issued its opinion
without the benefit of Congress's subsequent amendment to the Pueblo Lands Act, the New Mexico Supreme Court
drafted its opinion with the amendment as a backdrop that "helps clarify congressional intent regarding jurisdiction."
1 n.l, 142 P.3d at 888 n.1.
Romero, 2006-NMSC-039,
213. State v. Gutierrez, No. 24,731 (N.M. Ct. App. May 20, 2004).
214. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 7, 142 P.3d at 890.

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.

26, 142 P.3d at 896; see supranote 147 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000)).
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IV. RATIONALE OF THE NEW MEXICO SUPREME COURT
The court confronted two main issues in Romero. First, the court analyzed
whether the land where the alleged crimes occurred should be considered Indian
country.2 19 Second, the court examined whether the federal government had
extinguished Indian country status of the lands in question.220 The court applied a
de novo standard of review to the question of whether the state possessed
jurisdiction to prosecute Pueblo members for alleged crimes occurring within the
exterior boundaries of the Pueblos 2 21' but accepted the district court's findings of
fact as supported by substantial evidence.222 Throughout the opinion, the court
in [federal statutes]
applied the canon of construction requiring that "any22ambiguity
3
is to be resolved in favor of the Defendant Indians.
A. Indian Country Status of Pueblo Land Grants
The court began its analysis of the Indian country status of the lands in question
by citing Congress's codification of the definition of Indian country in the U.S.
Code. 224 Both of the defendants and the State agreed that section 115 1(c), discussing
Indian allotments, was not applicable to the case of either defendant in the
consolidated matter.225 Both defendants argued that the definition of Indian country
outlined in section 115 1(b) as part of a "dependent Indian communit[y] ' 226 encompassed the parcels of land in question. Mr. Romero alone contended that the land in
question was Indian country under section 1151(a), arguing
228 that a pueblo is a
reservation.22 7 The court addressed these arguments in turn.
1. Pueblos Are Dependent Indian Communities
In concluding that Pueblos are dependent Indian communities as used in section
115 1(b), the court looked first to the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v.
Sandoval.229 In Sandoval, the Court recognized that,

219. Id. (H 3-22, 142 P.3d at 890-95.
220. Id. (N 23-25, 142 P.3d at 895-96.
221. Id. 6, 142 P.3d at 890.
222. Id.
223. Id. 1 8, 142 P.3d at 890 (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)). In
Montana, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit." Montana, 471 U.S. at 766.
224. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 7, 142 P.3d at 890. The New Mexico Supreme Court quoted this section
verbatim:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian country,"
as used in this chapter..., means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian tides to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through
the same.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000)).
225. Id. 9, 142 P.3d at 890.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See infra notes 229-272.
229. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
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beginning as early as 1854 and continu[ing] up to the present time, the
legislative and executive branches of the Government have regarded and treated
the Pueblos of New Mexico as dependent communities entitled to its aid and
protection, like other Indian tribes, and.. .this assertion of guardianship over them
cannot be said to be arbitrary but must be regarded as both authorized and
controlling.23 °
The New Mexico Supreme Court then looked to the more recent U.S. Supreme
Court case Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie 231 to further explore the term
dependent Indian community as used in section 1151(b).,32 Noting that the New
Mexico Supreme Court previously relied on Venetie in State v. Frank,33 the Romero
court laid out the two-pronged Venetie test, which states that the term
"[dependent Indian community] refers to a limited category of Indian lands that
are neither reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two requirements-first,
they must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the
'
Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence."234
In Venetie, Justice Thomas described dependent Indian communities as "a limited
category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments," thereby
defining mutually exclusive categories of reservations under section 1151 (a) and
dependent Indian communities under section 115 1(b).235 Nevertheless, the Romero
majority stated that, although such a distinction "may be perfectly apt when construing the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act as in Venetie," it is not as appro'
priate when "considering the unique circumstances of New Mexico's pueblos."236
The court then proceeded with its Venetie analysis.
The first prong of Venetie requires that the land in question be "set aside by the
Federal Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land. 237 The court first
defined the unit of land to which it would apply the Venetie "set-aside" analysis.23 8
Although the State argued that the court should have examined the individual
parcels of private land in question, the court agreed with the defendants that all of
the land within the boundaries of a Pueblo must be "considered as a whole" when
determining whether the lands meet the federal "set-aside" standard.2 39 The court
then pointed out that even the individual parcels of land in question "have been

230. Id. at 47.
231. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
232. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039,

4, 142 P.3d at 339 (analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2000)); see also supra

notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
233. 2002-NMSC-026, -N 16-17, 52 P.3d 404, 408 (explaining that the two-pronged Venetie test is the
appropriate analysis for New Mexico courts when examining whether lands constitute a dependent Indian
community).
234. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 11, 142 P.3d at 891 (alteration in original) (quoting Venetie, 522 U.S. at
527).
235. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 1 12, 142 P.3d at 891.
Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527.
Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 13, 142 P.3d at 891-92.
Id. 1 13, 142 P.3d at 892.
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previously recognized as set aside by the federal government for the use of the
Indians as Indian land." 2"
In analyzing the land within the outer Pueblo boundaries as a whole, the court
looked to the New Mexico Enabling Act 24 ' as evidence that Congress had
established

that the Pueblo lands were Indian country.242 The court also

acknowledged its deference to the findings of fact by the district courts and an
"established historical record regarding governmental protection from the time of
the Spanish conquistadores through the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924" when it held that
the "set-aside" prong of its Venetie analysis was fulfilled.243
The court then moved on to hold that the second prong of Venetie was satisfied
because the land in question was the Pueblo as a whole, and because the Pueblos
have long been under federal superintendence. 244 Furthermore, the court pointed out
that this holding promotes policy concerns against checkerboarding,24 5 which is the
same concern that formed part of the legislative intent behind section 115 1.246 The
court acknowledged that Mr. Gutierrez established evidence at trial that led the
district judge to adopt a finding of fact, given deference by the New Mexico
Supreme Court, that the Pueblo of Pojoaque was under federal superintendence.24 7
Although Mr. Romero did not establish a similar record at the trial level because he
did not argue section 1151(b) until his appeal, the court refrained from remanding
his case for fact-finding on this particular issue, stating that it found "no reason to
question that Taos Pueblo is different than Pojoaque Pueblo in regard to federal
superintendence."' 248 Instead of remanding, the court determined that the second
prong of the Venetie test was met in both cases. 249 Furthermore, the court stated that
district courts may presume that Pueblos are always under federal superintendence,
and that "[flurther fact finding is only necessary in the event that the State makes a
regarding federal superintendence have
persuasive showing that circumstances
25 °
changed in a significant way.
2. Pueblos and Reservations Are Jurisdictionally Synonymous
Although the court pointed to the silence of section 1151(b) regarding the
treatment of non-Indian fee land, it read subsections (a) and (b) together and
concluded that "a pueblo satisfying § 115 1(b) is sufficiently similar to a reservation
in § 115 1(a) to merit identical treatment for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 25'

240. Id.
241. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557. "Indian country, which term shall also include all lands now
owned or occupied by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico...." Id. at 558.
242. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 14, 142 P.3d at 892.
243. Id. 1 15, 142 P.3d at 892.
244. Id. 1 16, 142 P.3d at 892.
245. Id. 16, 142 P.3d at 893. For a brief description of checkerboarding resulting from the allotment era,
see COHEN ET AL., supra note 26, § 1.04, at 78.
246. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 16, 142 P.3d at 892-93 (citing Hilderbrand v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 205, 207
(10th Cir. 1964)).
247. Id. 17, 142 P.3d at 893.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. id. 19, 142 P.3d at 894.
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First, the court looked to the wording in various congressional acts, citing specific
instances when Congress conflated the terms "Pueblo" and "reservation" or used
them interchangeably or in combination. 52 The court also pointed to several
legislative enactments concerning Indian country that apply to the Pueblos despite
not mentioning them explicitly. 53
Next, the court cited precedent from both federal and New Mexico courts that
construed the term "reservation" broadly.254 Specifically, the court looked to United
States v. McGowan,255 in which the U.S. Supreme Court looked beyond the semantic
differences between the terms "reservation" and "colony" to examine instead the
"protections afforded by the Federal government. '' 256 The Romero court also cited
Blatchford v. Gonzales,257 in which the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that

"'Indian reservations and dependent Indian communities 258are not two distinct
definitions of place, but definitions which largely overlap."
Finally, the court examined the New Mexico Court of Appeals case State v.
Ortiz, 259 which is factually similar to Romero because it involved an alleged major
crime occurring within a non-Indian town site that was also located within the
boundaries of a Pueblo.26° In Ortiz, the court of appeals held that the State lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged crime because it occurred in Indian country.26'
The Romero court pointed to specific language in Ortiz, which stated that "'land
within the exterior boundaries of a Pueblo is indistinguishable from land lying
within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation.' ,262 Finding that the terms
"Pueblo" and "reservation" and sections 115 1(a) and 115 1(b) are of an "overlapping
nature," the Romero court held that "fee land within a § 115 1(b) dependent Indian
community is Indian country just like the fee land within a § 115 1(a) reservation.2 63

252. Id. The court cited a statute pre-dating New Mexico statehood that referred to land "within Pueblo
reservations or lands," Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1069; a congressional ban on the "introduction
into Indian country, which term shall also include all lands now owned or occupied by the Pueblo Indians of New
Mexico," Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 558; and a congressional act allowing wine for religious use
"within the Indian country or any Indian Reservation, including the Pueblo Reservations in New Mexico," 25 U.S.C.
§ 253 (2000). Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 19, 142 P.3d at 894.
253. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 1 19, 142 P.3d at 894. The court cited the Consolidated Farm and Rural
Development Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1985(e)(1)(A)(i)(ll) (2000); Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. §
6312 (2000); Federal Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 101(a)(12) (2000); Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, id. § 450b (2000); Indian Financing Act, id. § 1452 (2000); Indian Child Welfare Act, id. § 1903
(2000); and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h)(1) (2000). Although the Romero court noted that neither the
National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3103 (2000), nor the Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25
U.S.C. § 3653 (2000), refer explicitly to the Pueblos, both of these statutes include Pueblos within their definition
of Indian tribes. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 19, 142 P.3d at 894; see also 25 U.S.C. § 3103(3); id. § 3653(3).
254. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 20, 142 P.3d at 894.
255. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
256. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 20, 142 P.3d at 894 (citing McGowan, 302 U.S. at 538-39).
257. 100 N.M. 333, 670 P.2d 944 (1983).
258. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 20, 142 P.3d at 894 (quoting Blatchford, 100 N.M. at 335,670 P.2d at 946
(1983)).
259. 105 N.M. 308, 731 P.2d 1352 (Ct. App. 1986).
260. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 120-21, 142 P.3d at 894-95 (citing Ortiz, 105 N.M. at 312, 731 P.2d at
1356).
261. Id.
262. Id. 20, 142 P.3d at 894 (quoting Ortiz, 105 N.M. at 312, 731 P.2d at 1356).
263. Id. 1 22, 142 P.3d at 894.
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B. CongressionalIntent to Extinguish Indian Country Status

Having found that the lands in question were Indian country for purposes of
jurisdiction under section 115 1, the court then analyzed whether the U.S. Congress
had extinguished its Indian country status. The court began by analogizing the facts
of the case before it to Seymour v. Superintendent,26 a U.S. Supreme Court case
holding that Washington State had no jurisdiction to prosecute an Indian charged
with a crime occurring within Indian country on fee land in a town that was within
reservation boundaries.265 The Romero court followed the U.S. Supreme Court's
analysis and rejected the State's arguments that Indian country status is extinguished
by alienation of land to non-Indians or by the establishment of a non-Indian town
within the reservation. 2 6
267
The court in Romero then examined whether the Pueblo Lands Act
extinguished the Indian country status of the lands in question 2. 68 To begin, the court
defined a standard requiring that the congressional action "'provide substantial and
compelling evidence of congressional intention to diminish Indian lands"' and
looked primarily to the explicit language of the Act.2 69 Although it acknowledged
that the Pueblo Lands Act allows for the extinguishment of Indian title to lands
originally held by the Pueblos, the court found no explicit mention of a change in
Indian country status or jurisdiction for the lands in question. 2 0 Finding no
"substantial and compelling evidence," the court dispatched the "State's overlybroad interpretation that the Pueblo Lands Act extinguishes Indian country status
merely by allowing non-Indians to have fee title to certain parcels., 271 Because the
lands at issue were held to be Indian country and because Congress had not
extinguished its status as such, the court concluded that the State lacked jurisdiction

264. 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
265. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 24, 142 P.3d at 895 (citing Seymour, 368 U.S. at 357-58).
266. Id. (citing Seymour, 368 U.S. 351).
267. Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, ch. 331, 43 Stat. 636 (repealed 2000).
268. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 25, 142 P.3d at 896. The special concurrence in Romero also analyzed
whether Congress ever intended to change criminal jurisdiction within Pueblo boundaries, pointing to a debate over
the Pueblo Lands Act in the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys concerning
section 3 of the Act, which provided that the state would have jurisdiction over former tribal lands ceded to nonIndians. Id. 1 32, 142 P.3d at 898 (Chivez, J.,
specially concurring). Although the special concurrence is correct
that section 3 of the Act was deleted by Congress, it is not clear from the legislative history that the intent in deleting
the section was to prevent the states from having jurisdiction over such lands. On the contrary, the common
understanding of the law at that time was that when Indian title was extinguished, so was Indian country status. This
understanding is evidenced by the following exchange between Senator Lenroot and Commissioner Burke: Senator
Lenroot, "Have you any doubt but what the State courts would have jurisdiction of non-Indian lands without this
section at all?" Commissioner Burke, "I have not a bit of doubt." Hearings on S. 3855 and S. 4223 Before the
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Public Lands and Surveys, 67th Cong. 90 (1923) (statements of Sen. Lenroot,
Member, S.Comm. on Public Lands and Surveys & Hon. Charles H. Burke, Comm'r of Indian Affairs); see also
id. at 88-90; Hearings on H.R. 13452 and H.R. 13674 Before the H. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 67th Cong. 330
(1923) (statement of Mr. A.B. Renehan, New Mexico attorney) ("I do not consider [section 3] necessary, for...when
the Indian title has been extinguished, the State courts will have jurisdiction."); State v. Romero, 2004-NMCA-012,
15-17, 84 P.3d 670, 674-75.
269. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 25, 142 P.3d 887, 896 (quoting Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 472
(1984)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
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over the cases of Mr. Romero and Mr. Gutierrez 2 The court disposed of the legal
issues before it, but its analysis deserves further scrutiny.
V. ANALYSIS
The Romero court arrived at a decision that affirms the Pueblo's inherent
sovereignty, yet has implications on civil jurisdiction in Pueblo Indian country.
Before exploring these implications, however, it is helpful to examine the way in
which the court arrived at its holding. First this Note examines the court's analysis
under Venetie, concluding that such analysis may not be necessary and has
problematic consequences.27 3 Next, the Note continues by examining the court's use
of the terms "Pueblo" and "reservation" in its analysis.274

A. Venetie Analysis, Troublesome Dicta
The Romero court dedicated a great deal of space in its opinion to the twopronged Venetie analysis,27 ' but, as argued by the special concurrence authored by
Justice Chdvez, the majority may not have needed to go so far to decide the case.276
The majority opinion admits that in Venetie, "[t]o determine if the land was Indian
country, the Court construed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1601 (1971), which has no bearing on the land ownership system for New Mexico
pueblos.' 277 Nevertheless, by applying its analysis under Venetie, the majority
refused to distinguish the history and legal status of the Pueblo land grants278 from
those at issue in Venetie.279

The majority could have taken the more straightforward approach suggested by
the special concurrence.280 Under this analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of the Pueblos' status as dependent Indian communities in Sandoval2"' is
enough to establish that the land in question is Indian country.282 Further analysis of
the Indian country status of the land would then be unnecessary because in Romero
the alleged crimes occurred within the original Pueblo boundaries, and "[P]ueblos

272. Id. 26, 142 P.3d at 896.
273. See infra Part V.A.
274. See infra Part V.B.
275. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 1 11-17, 142 P.3d at 891-93.
276. Id. V[ 29-30, 142 P.3d at 897 (Chfivez, J., specially concurring). But see United States v. Arrieta, 436
F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2006), cert denied, 126 S. Ct. 2368 (2006). In Arrieta, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
engaged in a Venetie analysis and held that "all lands within the exterior boundaries of a Pueblo land grant, to which
the Pueblo hold title, are Indian country within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 ." Id. at 1250-51 (emphasis added).
The Arrieta court, however, did not address lands within Pueblo land grants that are held in fee simple by
non-Indians.
277. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 11, 142 P.3d at 891.
278. See supra Part II.A.
279. The lands at issue in Venetie comprised approximately 1.8 million acres located "[n]early 800 miles
north of Alaska's capital-above the Arctic circle," which the Native Village of Venetie holds in fee simple,
pursuant to their election to take title to their former reservation lands after their reservations were dissolved under
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-28 (2000). See Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting
Indian Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 76-83 (1999).
280. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, t 28-30, 142 P.3d at 897 (ChAvez, J., specially concurring).
281. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913).
282. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 1 28, 142 P.3d at 897 (ChAvez, J., specially concurring).
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'
have already been recognized as Indian country."283
The two-pronged Venetie
analysis should only apply if the alleged crimes in question were committed on land
not previously recognized as Indian country, or land that presents a problematic
classification as Indian country.2M Indeed, the Venetie court itself recognized that
the Pueblos are dependent Indian communities and that Congress "could exercise
jurisdiction over the Pueblo lands, under its general power over 'all dependent
Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or
territory subsequently acquired.' "285
Furthermore, the majority's analysis under Venetie results in problematic dicta
because of its potential for causing procedural delays in criminal prosecution.2 86 In
holding that the "set-aside" prong of the Venetie test is satisfied in part by factual
findings by the trial court, the majority implied that fact-finding may be necessary
to find the existence of a dependent Indian community.2 87 Although the majority
later stated that "pueblos are subject to federal superintendence, and a district court
may so presume, '' 288 it goes on to suggest that "[flurther fact finding is only
necessary in the event that the State makes a persuasive showing that circumstances
regarding federal superintendence have changed in a significant way. 2 89 These
references to factual findings with regard to the status of Pueblo lands as Indian
country are unnecessary, however, because the U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly
held that the Pueblos are to be considered as dependent Indian communities. 29
Furthermore, fact-finding on such a jurisdictional matter would be conducted by a
trial court at the outset of a proceeding, causing unneeded delay.2 9'
Such a delay and a court's disregard of clear holdings by the U.S. Supreme Court
could be avoided by refraining from applying the Venetie two-pronged analysis to
the Pueblo land grants. Instead, a court would need only look at "a) whether the
alleged crime was committed within the exterior boundaries of a pueblo, and b)
whether the accused is an Indian within the meaning of the Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153."29 Because both of these elements were satisfied in Romero, it
should have been clear that state courts have no criminal jurisdiction over the
petitioners.

283. Id. 29, 142 P.3d at 897. Nevertheless, the special concurrence continued:
If an analysis were required under Venetie I would conclude that the "set-aside" of the pueblo
lands by the federal government occurred at the time it confirmed the pueblo land grants. I would
also conclude that "superintending control" of the pueblos has been shown through the Pueblo
Lands Act....
Id. 30, 142 P.3d at 897 (citations omitted).
284. See id. 29, 142 P.3d at 897 (citing Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 530 (1998)
("[Sjection 1151 does not alter the definitions of Indian country as described in earlier cases, including Sandoval.")).
285. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 528 (quoting Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46).
286. See Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 30, 142 P.3d at 897 (Chdvez, J., specially concurring).
287. Id. 1 15, 142 P.3d at 892 (majority opinion).
288. Id. 1 17, 142 P.3d at 892.
289. Id.
290. See infra Part IH.B.2.
291. See Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 30, 142 P.3d at 897 (Chdvez, J., specially concurring). The special
concurrence noted that, "'[if an extensive factual inquiry is necessary to make a jurisdictional
determination...criminal trials will be delayed."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 105 N.M. 308,
312, 731 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Ct. App. 1986)).
292. Id.
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B. Pueblo, Reservation, or Both?
The majority's analysis is also problematic because it gives insufficient
consideration to the fact that the Pueblos hold their land grants in fee simple under
federal superintendence as a dependent Indian community. Although Pueblos may
also hold reservation lands, the Pueblo land grants are not reservations and are
therefore not subject to unilateral or uncompensated diminishment or
extinguishment by the United States.293 The special concurrence points out that
"[t]his is one of the unique, historical, and still significant differences between the
pueblo lands and the reservations of other Indian tribes. 294 If Congress were to
choose to reduce Pueblo fee land holdings, it would commit a taking of private fee
simple property, subject to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.295 In contrast, the United States can unilaterally extinguish Indian title
to reservation land because the federal government holds fee title to such land in
trust for the tribe.296

The court seemed persuaded by the argument of the brief of amici curiae
submitted by the American Indian Law Center, Inc., and the University of New
Mexico Native American Law Students Association 297 that "Pueblos Are
Reservations for Purposes of Criminal Jurisdiction Under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (a). ' 298
However, the court did not go as far as the amici curiae urged and state that Pueblos
are equivalent to reservations, but instead stated in dicta that "a pueblo satisfying §
1151(b) is sufficiently similar to a reservation in § 1151(a) to merit identical
99
treatment for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction. '2
This statement is in direct
contradiction with Justice Thomas's opinion in Venetie, which was quoted by the
majority, that "'[w]e now hold that [dependent Indian community] refers to a limited
'3
category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments. 00
Recognizing that Justice Thomas "seemed to indicate that a particular piece of
Indian country could not be both a reservation.. .and a dependent Indian
community, ' 30 1 the majority nevertheless stated that such a distinction was not as
helpful to New Mexico courts when analyzing the Indian country status of the
Pueblos as it was to the U.S. Supreme Court when analyzing Alaskan native
settlements.3 °2
The Romero court's analysis under Venetie and its conflation of the terms
"Pueblo" and "reservation" are two problematic aspects of its opinion. In addition,

293. For a description of federal power to extinguish Indian title, see COHEN ET AL., supra note 26, § 15.09[ 1],
at 1019-30.
294. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 131, 142 P.3d at 898 (Chivez, J., specially concurring).
295. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
296. See COHEN ETAL., supra note 26, at 1019-22.
297. Brief of the American Indian Law Center, Inc. & the University of New Mexico Native American Law
Students Ass'n Amicus Curiaein Support of Defendant-Petitioner, Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 142 P.3d 887 (No.
28,410).

298. Id. at 3.
299. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 1 19, 142 P.3d at 894; see also supra note 251 and accompanying text.
300. Id. I 11, 142 P.3d at 891 (alteration in original) (quoting Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S.
520, 527 (1998)); see also supranotes 232-236.
301. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 12, 142 P.3d at 891.
302. Id.
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there are other implications of the court's opinion that impact the Pueblos,
surrounding communities, and legal practitioners in Pueblo Indian country.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The Romero opinion has two important implications. While one implication adds
a layer of complexity to an already multifaceted area of the law, the other reaffirms
longstanding law and policy. The former is the impact of the Romero decision on
civil jurisdiction in New Mexico Indian country; the latter is the affirmation of
inherent Pueblo sovereignty expressed by the opinion. This Note discusses each in
turn.

A. Civil Jurisdictionin Indian Country
Although Congress's recent amendment of the Pueblo Lands Act demystifies the
jurisdictional status of lands in and around Pueblo Indian country for purposes of
criminal jurisdiction, it does not address civil jurisdiction. In New Mexico, Romero
will be the controlling precedent for determining which sovereign has jurisdiction
to adjudicate civil matters that arise within Pueblo land grants. Now that the New
Mexico Supreme Court has held that all land within the Pueblo land grants is Indian
country, New Mexico courts are bound to that determination when deciding whether
they have jurisdiction over a civil claim arising on that land.
Once litigants establish that the cause of action arose in Indian country, trial
30 3
courts will still need to consider who the parties are and which, if any, are Indians.
If a court determines that the plaintiff and defendant are both Indians, then tribal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction. 31 When both parties are non-Indians, jurisdiction
will typically default to the state, but may fall under exclusive tribal jurisdiction if
the subject matter has a direct impact on tribal concerns. 30 5 If the plaintiff is a nonIndian and the defendant is an Indian, then the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction. 306 If
the plaintiff is an Indian and the defendant is a non-Indian, then the jurisdictional
outcome depends on whether the action arises on Indian-held land or on non-Indian
fee land. 3 7 If the action arose on Indian-held land, then the tribal court will have
jurisdiction if their law so allows, with a possibility of concurrent jurisdiction with
the State.30 8 If the action arose on non-Indian fee land, then the State has jurisdiction,
which is subject to the possibility of tribal jurisdiction if the case involves certain
important interests of the tribe. 3 9 In addition, federal courts may have concurrent
jurisdiction if there is diversity of citizenship or if the case involves a federal
question. 1 0
These jurisdictional considerations may also play out differently based on the
substantive law of the cause of action at bar, such as whether the case involves the

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 224-26 (4th ed. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

310. See supra Part 1l.C.2.
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law of contract or tort. Although many contracts may include a forum selection
clause mandating the parties' choice of forum for resolution of disputes as well as
a choice of which substantive law to apply, these provisions will be unenforceable
if the forum chosen would not have jurisdiction without the clause.311 As a result,
a poorly drafted forum selection clause may prohibit jurisdiction in the only forum
that would otherwise be available, leaving the parties with "no forum having
jurisdiction to decide disputes under the contract."3' 12 Furthermore, although the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a forum selection clause precluding
tribal jurisdiction in Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Manufacturing Corp.,313 the tribal
exhaustion principle may dictate that the first determination of tribal court
jurisdiction take place in tribal court.3 1 4

Unlike contract actions, in which the parties may select ahead of time their forum
for resolution of disputes, tort actions arise without planning for such
eventualities. 351 Romero becomes important in tort actions occurring within the
Pueblo land grant boundaries when one or both of the parties is Indian. For example,
what would happen if a tort action were brought by a non-Indian New Mexico
citizen against a Pueblo member for damages arising from an incident in the Town
of Taos within the Taos Pueblo land grant? Federal jurisdiction is most likely
precluded because there is no federal question involved with a common-law tort and
diversity of citizenship is not satisfied.316 State jurisdiction would likely be
precluded by the U.S. Supreme Court case of Williams v. Lee,3 17 which held that "the
exercise of state jurisdiction [in cases such as this] would undermine the authority
of the tribal courts over [Indian] affairs and hence would infringe the right of the
Indians to govern themselves. 318 Therefore, exclusive jurisdiction would almost
certainly reside in the tribal courts.319
This development will increase tribal court dockets and possibly provide them
with jurisdiction over a greater variety of matters. Nevertheless, some non-Indians
may not be optimistic about the prospect of having to take their claim to an
unfamiliar tribal court.320 Many tribal courts, however, are sophisticated judicial

311. Mark A. Jarboe, The Gaming Industry on American Indian Lands: Financingand Development Issues,
in PRACTICING LAW INST., THE GAMING INDUSTRY ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDS 167, 182 (1994).

312. Mark A. Jarboe, FundamentalLegal PrinciplesAffecting Business Transactionsin Indian Country, 17
HAMLNE L. REv. 417, 442 (1994).

313. 983 F.2d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 1993) ("To refuse enforcement of this routine contract provision would be
to undercut the Tribe's self-government and self-determination.").
314. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
315. One area in which New Mexico state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts over tort
claims, pursuant to gaming compacts, is when non-Indians sue tribes for torts occurring at Indian gaming
establishments. See Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 2007-NMSC-008, 141-45, 154 P.3d 644, 655-56.
316. See supra notes 165-172 and accompanying text.
317. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
318. Id. at 223; see also supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
319. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
320. See Lynn H. Slade, Structuring and FinancingNatural Resource and Energy Development on Indian
Lands, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Spring 1993, at 7, 10 ("The developer also should consider seeking agreement
to a forum other than tribal courts or administrative agencies to resolve disputes arising under the agreement.
Generally, tribes fear off-reservation courts, and developers fear tribal courts."); Orlando Romero, Court Case Poses
Threat to Non-Indians, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Mar. 11, 2007, at Fl.
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institutions with formalized rules and procedures similar to state and federal
courts.3 2 '

For example, the Pueblo of Pojoaque Tribal Court operates pursuant to a Tribal
Constitution,322 allows for appeals,323 and offers alternative dispute resolution in the
form of mediation, settlement facilitation, and traditional methods.324 In addition, the
tribal judges and prosecutors in the Pueblo of Pojoaque Tribal Court are attorneys
licensed by the State Bar of New Mexico.325 Both English and Spanish may be used
in Pojoaque tribal court, and interpreters are available. 326 Tribal rules of civil
procedure, criminal procedure, appellate procedure, and evidence have been
compiled and published and are available to practitioners, as is the substantive law
compiled in the tribal code, including provisions governing family law, juvenile
justice, housing and land use, commercial transactions, torts, criminal law, and
environmental law.327 Jury trials are available and hearings are recorded and
transcribed. 328 As a result, a non-Indian appearing in a tribal court such as that of the
Pueblo of Pojoaque would have many of the same protections and opportunities as
a citizen of one state being summoned by the court of another state.329
B. Affirmation of Inherent Pueblo Sovereignty
In Romero, the New Mexico Supreme Court echoed the U.S. Congress in
recognizing the inherent sovereignty of the Pueblos. Congress included specific
language in its amendment of the Pueblo Lands Act that reads, "The Pueblo has
jurisdiction, as an act of the Pueblos' inherent power as an Indian tribe, over any
offense committed by a member of the Pueblo or an Indian."33 This congressional
enactment confirms that tribal jurisdiction is not federal jurisdiction delegated to the
tribes, but instead is an element of the intrinsic sovereign powers that tribes have
possessed since their origins.
In light of the contentious nature of the inherent sovereignty/delegation debate,
Pueblo leaders were understandably concerned by earlier versions of the
congressional amendment to the Pueblo Lands Act that specifically addressed
jurisdiction in Pueblo Indian country without any discussion of the source of such
jurisdiction.3 3' This concern was magnified by the recent discourse on inherent tribal
sovereignty between the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress:33 2 the Court's

321. See infra notes 322-329.
322. See NEW MEXICO TRIBALCOURT HANDBOOK 2006, Pojoaque Pueblo 2007, at 3, 6 TRIBAL L.J., available
at http://tlj.unm.edu/handbook (follow "Pojoaque Pueblo" hyperlink").
323. Id. at 8.
324. Id. at 5.
325. Id. at 6.
326. Id. at 7.
327. Id. at7, 12-14.
328. Id. at 8-9.
329. Although many tribal courts in New Mexico possess a level of sophistication and development similar
to that of Pojoaque Pueblo, others do not. For a description of each tribal court system in New Mexico, see NEW
MEXICO TRIBAL COURT HANDBOOK 2006, supra note 322.

330. S. 279, 109th Cong., 119 Stat. 2573 (2005).
331. See Smith, supra note 196, at 2-3.
332. See supra notes 186-196 and accompanying text.
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decision in Duro v. Reina;3 33 the congressional amendment of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 334 which essentially overturned the Duro decision; and the Court
upholding
Congress's power to enact the ICRA amendment in United States v.
335
Lara.
Putting at ease the concerns of Pueblo leaders, New Mexico's delegation to the
U.S. Congress united in passing the Pueblo Lands Act amendment with language
that specifically and unequivocally affirms the Pueblos' inherent sovereignty as the
root of their jurisdictional powers.336 The delegation was successful, and the
finalized text of the amendment is a powerful confirmation that Congress recognizes
and respects the inherent sovereignty of the Pueblos.337
Early in its opinion, the Romero court recognized the congressional intent behind
the Pueblo Lands Act amendment. 338 This recognition undoubtedly aided the court
in its resolution of this matter, and Justice Serna crafted an opinion that reaffirms
New Mexico's recognition of the Pueblos' sovereign status.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Romero, the New Mexico Supreme Court rendered a decision that is consistent
with the federal recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty expressed in the Duro-fix,
Lara, and the Pueblo Lands Act amendment. Unfortunately, the majority's analysis
opens troublesome doors to undermine this recognition of the sovereignty of the
New Mexico Pueblos through its analysis of the Pueblos under Venetie. Furthermore, the court's blurred distinctions between Pueblos and reservations, although
not material to the outcome of this case, could prove problematic in cases regarding
rights to and arising from land, particularly when the status of the land is a pivotal
issue.339

Future cases will define the contours of civil jurisdiction in Pueblo Indian country
with Romero adding complexity to a legal landscape already difficult to navigate.
The unanswered questions created by Romero will undoubtedly be litigated in cases
that will be watched closely and cautiously by the communities that have existed in
New Mexico for generations.

333. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
334. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
335. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). For an analysis of the implications of Lara on tribal sovereignty, see MacKenzie
T. Batzer, Note, Trapped in a Tangled Web United States v. Lara: The Trouble with Tribes and the Sovereignty
Debacle, 8 CHAP. L. REv. 283 (2005); supranotes 186-196 and accompanying text.
336. Smith, supranote 196, at 3.
337. Id.
338. State v. Romero, 2006-NMSC-039, 1 n., 142P.3d 887, 888 n.1, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1494 (2007).
339. See supra Part V.A-B.

